A woman who says she was sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein has launched a federal lawsuit in Manhattan, accusing Bank of America of enabling his trafficking operation through its financial services. In the complaint, she claims that Epstein’s accountants in 2013 asked her to open an account with the bank, into which funds were later transferred for various expenses. Those transactions, she argues, should have triggered internal warnings, yet the bank allegedly failed to report suspicious activity in a timely fashion. As a result, she says, Bank of America knowingly facilitated Epstein’s network by providing services even in the face of warning signs.
The lawsuit names the plaintiff under a pseudonym—“Jane Doe”—and seeks damages, including a request to certify the case as a class action. Alongside Bank of America, she is also suing Bank of New York Mellon, accusing it of aiding in the processing of roughly $378 million linked to Epstein’s enterprises. Her legal team contends that these banks, by servicing accounts and handling transfers, helped sustain Epstein’s operations by ensuring liquidity and anonymity for traffickers.
If successful, the suit would represent another legal blow to the financial institutions that previously did business with Epstein. In prior cases, large banks such as JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank settled with Epstein’s survivors, agreeing to payouts in the hundreds of millions of dollars. These institutions faced allegations that they ignored red flags, failed to monitor transactions properly, or continued to serve Epstein despite evidence of illicit activity. The precedent suggests that courts are increasingly willing to entertain claims that banks owe a duty beyond mere transactional service, extending liability when they allegedly facilitate crime.
Yet the path ahead is far from straightforward. One of the central legal questions will be establishing causation—that Bank of America’s actions not only contributed to Epstein’s scheme but did so in a way that can be directly tied to harm suffered by this particular plaintiff. The claimant must persuade the court that the bank either knew or should have known that its services were being used for trafficking. Bank of America is likely to counter by pointing to compliance protocols, internal safeguards, and anti-money laundering regulations it says it followed, including filing Suspicious Activity Reports, or at least showing it reasonably responded to red flags.
Another hurdle for the lawsuit is timeliness. Bank of America may argue that some of the claims are barred by statutes of limitations, particularly where abuse or financial conduct dates back a decade or more. Ensuring that critical evidence—banking records, internal correspondence, emails, audit trails—is preserved and produced will be essential to the plaintiff’s case. The court’s willingness to grant discovery could make or break her ability to map Epstein’s financial flows through the bank’s systems.
If the class action request is accepted, the implications would broaden exponentially. Rather than standing as a single victim’s claim, the case could allow many other survivors to join the lawsuit, dramatically increasing potential liability. The plaintiffs would need to satisfy the requirements for class certification: demonstrating common questions of fact and law, adequate representation, and numerosity, among others.
Meanwhile, Bank of New York Mellon faces scrutiny for its role in processing large transfers tied to Epstein, including alleged moves of hundreds of millions of dollars. The dual litigation strategy underscores how survivors are targeting both custodial banks and correspondent institutions as part of a broader financial chain.
Historically, some courts have been skeptical of claims that financial institutions should be held liable for downstream criminal misuse of funds. Defendants often argue that imposing such liability would chill legitimate banking activity and require them to police clients far beyond feasible compliance expectations. Plaintiffs respond that where banks closely monitor and service clients with significant suspicious histories, they cross a threshold of responsibility.
Given the high stakes, the litigation will likely push key questions about the obligations of big banks in handling accounts of individuals with known suspect associations. It may force scrutiny of internal compliance systems, thresholds for filing reports, and whether banks must do more than minimal monitoring when signals of abuse arise.
As the case proceeds, courts will need to weigh how far banks should be responsible for policing criminal clients, how clearly warning signs must be spelled out, and how survivors can trace financial support networks back to harm. The outcome will not only affect this survivor’s chance at compensation, but may also reshape the legal boundaries of bank accountability in complex trafficking cases.